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The Responsibility of Governing and the 
Changes in the Workers’ Party of Brazil 
Emil Albert Sobottka 
This article analyzes the trajectory of the Workers’ Party (PT – Partido 
dos Trabalhadores) in Brazil, emphasizing the three points in time that 
most marked its history: its origin and initial proposals as an ideological 
oriented socialist party, the changes that occurred when it began to  
administrate several medium-sized and large cities and implanted the  
Participatory Budget (Orçamento Participativo), and finally, its victory in 
the presidential elections and the main lines of the policy implemented.  
Key words: Workers’ party, political parties, participation, democracy, 
Brazil
The Workers’ Party (PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores) is currently the sub-
ject of discussions in the everyday world of politics and also in the academic 
world. Established in 1980, in the wake of the movements for union renewal, 
resistance to the military regime and redemocratization of Brazil, for years it 
had radical proposals and political practice as its distinctive mark. Initially it 
participated in the elections rather to polarize public discussion on social con-
flicts than to come to office. Over time it took on the responsibility of being 
the government in several cities and began to be known for its local govern-
ment practices – with the implementation of the Participatory Budget, the 
prioritization of policies for the lower income population, and advocating a 
radical democracy. The wide dissemination of these practices, the World So-
cial Forum that was held in Porto Alegre, a showcase of the PT administra-
tion, and the election of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva as president of Brazil in 
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2002, gave many militants and sympathizers the hope that a different world 
from that dominated by neoliberal capitalism could be possible. But it was a 
fragile hope, permeated by voluntarism which underestimated the breadth of 
concessions made by the PT in seeking to maximize votes to conquer power.  
This text will present a brief reconstruction of this trajectory of the PT, 
emphasizing the three points in time that most marked its history: its origin 
and initial proposals, the changes that occurred when it began to administrate 
several medium-sized and large cities, and finally, victory in the presidential 
elections and the main lines of the policy implemented. 
The Workers’ Party (PT) has been a subject of study practically ever since 
it was founded, and the literature about it can broadly be divided into the 
same three periods. The initial studies focused on the circumstances that fa-
vored its founding (Oliveira 1988), the initial project that would distinguish it 
from the other parties (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1991; César 2002), individual 
trajectories (Harnecker 1994) and militancy (Gaglietti 2003). The specificity
of the PT was the strong point of that time. In the 1990s, the literature on the 
PT began to concern itself with the challenge of being a local government 
(Bittar 1992; Jacobi 1994; Couto 1995), the success and failure of the PT 
administrations (Simões 1992), the Participary Budget (Dias 2002; Santos 
2002), and the proposal for democracy. A more critical literature points at the 
risks of changing the characteristics of the original ideology, the conflict be-
tween administrations and the party rank and file, changes and incongruities 
in party strategy (Leal 2005). It is also seen that the PT leaders and even the 
voters are increasingly recruited from the middle class (César 2002), leaving 
aside the original base. Professionalized militants and institutionalization are 
equally pointed out as harmful to the original party project (Novaes 1993). In 
recent years the studies have focused mainly on the recent changes in the PT, 
related to the 2002 presidential elections and the administration of Luis 
Inácio Lula da Silva (Samuels 2004). This more recent literature has pre-
dominantly a political science perspective, with a lack of analyses focusing 
on the PT trajectory based on its relationship with social movements and the 
original utopia of a more just society.  
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The project of a democratic socialism 
The Workers’ Party (PT) was founded by intellectuals and activists of classi-
cal and new social movements. The military dictatorship that governed the 
country from 1964 to 1985 had been weakened at the end of the 1970s and 
had begun a process of gradual, controlled distension. The economy that, at 
the beginning of that decade had undergone a very strong expansion, had suf-
fered the impact of the two oil crises. The political alliances that had pro-
vided support to the military regime slowly broke down, and both the middle 
urban sectors and part of the entrepreneurship began to openly criticize the 
military government. Internally there were divisions that were expressed in 
the dispute for the presidency of the Republic in the Electoral College by two 
generals. In various sectors of the economy, strikes began to break out, the 
main one being that of the metallurgical workers in 1978, led by Lula and 
supported, among others, by the local hierarchy of the Roman Catholic 
Church.
The two-party regime implemented by decree by the military was gradu-
ally getting out of control, the opposition was gaining more votes, attaining 
60% in the legislative elections of 1978. The pressure for direct mayoral elec-
tions in large cities, for state governorship and for the Presidency of the Re-
public was also growing.1 In 1979 an amnesty of political crimes practiced 
for political reasons was proclaimed, both for the military and their helpers 
and for the opposition, which enabled exiled or persecuted politicians to re-
turn. Two-party politics was revoked, creating the possibility of forming new 
political parties. 
Three social segments, basically, came together to form the PT: the new 
labor unionism, new social movements connected to the Roman Catholic 
Church and intellectuals from the classical left. 
The Brazilian unions were historically connected to the Ministry of Labor. 
During the military regime, this connection took on the more explicit form of 
1  In 1982, the first elections for governor and mayor took place in the capitals and large 
cities. The campaign in favor of direct presidential elections resulted in one of the 
greatest mobilizations ever seen in Brazil in 1984 (campaign for Direct Elections Now 
[“Diretas Já”]), but an agreement of the elite with the opposition put off the elections 
to 1989, when the PT made it to the second round of the elections with Lula. 
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control and fostering conforming leaders. The lack of synchrony between 
growth and modernization of several segments of industry and the conditions 
of the workers motivated the fighting spirit of some union leaders. They be-
gan mobilizations among the workers, at the workplace itself, seeking to in-
form them about their situation and their rights, challenging the prevailing 
order. The line of confrontation which gave them the name of “authentic” as 
opposed to the conformists, “pelegos” (“yellows”) gained publicity, espe-
cially with the strikes in the more developed sectors, such as the metallurgical 
one. At that time it became clear to these unionists that they needed to find an 
adequate political representation. After assessing the already existing alterna-
tives, they chose to establish their own party (Oliveira 1988). 
The Roman Catholic Church, that had initially supported the military coup 
from 1964, soon distanced itself from it, and not only began to criticize it, but 
also to shelter people and groups that had no other spaces in which to articu-
late. The new theology that had emerged from the Vatican Council II, and es-
pecially from the Latin American Episcopal Conference in Medellin, led to 
pastoral work that unified popular religiosity, political criticism and com-
mitment in the urban peripheries and in rural regions. The clearest expres-
sions of this renewal were the Ecclesial Base Communities (Comunidades 
Eclesiais de Base) and the different kinds of pastoral work (ecclesial minis-
tries specialized in issues such as health, land, workers, youth, and others). 
The theological-political discussion about everyday issues, which used a 
methodology called seeing, judging and acting, created favorable conditions 
for the rise of advocacy movements. The ownership of urban lands, housing, 
public transport, living conditions in the neighborhood and at work, public 
services, the unbridled price rises, besides issues such as respect for human 
rights, led to a great number of new social movements (Jacobi 1987). 
In these movements a critical view of capitalism was developing, a great 
sensitivity towards injustice, and the will to build a better world. Slowly na-
tional thematic organizations were formed as well as an articulation with the 
union oppositions. These groups considered themselves a people’s move-
ment, valued their autonomy and were determined to construct their own his-
tory. Together with the Church, other bodies, such as the Brazilian Press As-
sociation (Associação Brasileira de Imprensa) and the Brazilian Bar Associa-
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tion (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil) supported these movements. The soli-
darity of these movements was essential for the striking metallurgical work-
ers in 1978, and the confidence generated there made it easier for the new so-
cial movements to join the articulations of the “authentic” union workers in 
favor of forming their own party. In a recent interview, Francisco de Oliveira 
(2006) says: “The contribution of ecclesial base communities to form the PT 
was extraordinary. It was this that led to forming a sense of ethics in the PT 
that is rare in the Brazilian parties”.
Very close to these movements there was still a reasonable number of in-
tellectuals that were highly involved and committed to some causes, but acted 
independently, such as Paulo Freire, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, Moacir 
Gadotti, Francisco de Oliveira, Herbert de Sousa (Betinho). They were part 
of the social base of the PT, sometimes as members, sometimes as sympa-
thizers. Considering the characteristics of their individual joining and their 
action, they can hardly be treated as a single segment. The rural movements 
were in the beginning almost absent; they became part of the PT gradually, 
until they formed a very important base.  
The third segment that helped form the PT, the classical, Marxist-oriented 
left, was numerically small and subdivided into many and diversified groups, 
generally well-disciplined. They were dissidents from the Communist party, 
radical Christians and Trotskyists, mostly intellectuals or leaders, who felt 
disillusioned, and therefore abandoned their unions, churches, universities 
and similar organizations, where they were part of strongly articulated 
groups. Some of them had even taken up arms against the dictatorship. Many 
were disillusioned as to the strategy of a prolonged war with a rural base to 
implement socialism and found in the proletariat a possible subject of social 
transformation. 
Discussions around creating a party of workers and its connection or not 
with members of the parliamentary opposition, the socialist and class orienta-
tion went on for two years and occurred basically in the union environment. 
The basic documents of this period were the Letter of Principles and the Po-
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litical Platform, launched on May 1, 1979.2 In that letter a class party “with-
out bosses” was advocated, whose ultimate objective was to overcome capi-
talism and the transition to socialism, besides focusing on the issue of democ-
ratic liberties, living and working conditions and that particular moment of 
national life. The party that was finally created had to build its internal unity, 
a common interpretation of reality and aims that could be shared. The three 
main social segments that constituted it had their own strong traditions and 
idiosyncrasies – the unionists with their class vision, the left wing Christians 
who were disillusioned with politics and the left wing militants with their 
centralist concept of discipline – which constituted a challenge for unity. Ac-
cording to Samuels (1997):  
Brazil has always had leftwing parties: what is new about the PT in Bra-
zilian politics – in which even these parties were formed from top down – 
was not their leftism, but the fact that it was organized from bottom up. 
Workers’ unions and social movements which, in the 1970s were in opposi-
tion to the authoritarian government, constituted the bases that formed the 
PT. The great difference between the PT and the leftwing parties of its time 
and the political history of the country, in general, also supported by the un-
ions, is that its rank and file were major resources and had an active role in 
the planning, institutionalization and decision-making process of the party.  
Thus Brazil began to have a programmatic party, an advocate of the sys-
tem’s  democratization and structural reforms such as income redistribution, 
strengthening of the national companies, land reform, expanding social rights 
both of the workers and of the population on the urban peripheries, radical 
changes in the economy such as breaking with the IMF, nationalization of 
banks and non-payment of the foreign debts, besides handing the means of 
production over to the State. The project of democratic socialism was never 
detailed by the party, but by proposing it, the PT innovated, breaking a per-
verse relationship that had been historically constituted in Brazil between au-
thoritarianism and the advocacy of social rights. The PT proposed to unify 
2  Save indication to the contrary, the documents of the PT until 1998 are quoted from 
the collection of texts Resoluções de encontros e congressos, 1979-1998 (PT 1998), 
and the later ones from www.pt.org.br (consulted between Dec 10, 2005 and Apr 
2006).
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the struggle for democracy and for the social rights of citizenship, even, ac-
cording to Moreira (2000), at the price of “reneging the legacy of the preced-
ing left and accepting a democratic socialism within the standards of capital-
ism, but with income redistribution”. 
The PT between ideology and pragmatism 
Before reconstructing the second moment of the PT’s trajectory, when it 
came into office in several local governments, three moments of its political 
action should be mentioned.  They express the tension experienced internally 
between the programmatic-ideological option prevalent in the beginning, and 
a more pragmatic insertion in the political and electoral game that would 
gradually prevail.  
At its electoral première, in 1982, the official discourse of the PT was that 
“workers vote for workers”. The conditions were adverse, since the military 
regime had, in a case by case system, linked the vote, obliging the voter to 
vote all the way from city councilman to governor for candidates from a same 
party, and eliminated the party acronym from the paper ballot. The policy of 
not making alliances resulted in isolation and a wearing defeat when the ex-
pectation of having most people join did not prove right. A greater impact 
than obtaining only 3.5% of the valid votes on the national level and electing 
only two mayors came from the fact that less votes than the number of party 
members were obtained in six states (Voigt 1990). Even within unionism, the 
dispute with the Communists and other organizations became more aggres-
sive. A major internal consequence of the self-criticism that ensued, which 
also marked the history of the PT, was the rise of an internal “articulation” of 
the independent segments, with strong support from social movements, sec-
tors of the churches and intellectuals. It had a more pragmatic orientation and 
began to take up a majority proportion of the party leadership. This was the 
beginning of rendering explicit internal tendencies,3 officially acknowledged 
3  Tendencies are organizations that are usually formalized and disciplined within the PT, 
with an intense political life, through which theses are discussed, internal elections are 
waged, electoral campaigns are structured and patronage jobs are distributed and su-
pervised. Most activists are rather faithful members of a tendency than of the PT.  
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in 1987, after debating for several years. These tendencies are even now the 
main reference for the militants (Gaglietti 2003), and function as a party 
within the party.  
Some time later, in January 1985, a candidate who was an opponent of the 
military regime in the last indirect election for the President’s Office was 
elected. This form of election confirmed the defeat of the Direct Elections 
Now movement, which had mobilized millions of persons to defend the direct 
vote for the Presidency of the country. The PT decided not to participate in 
the collegium and excluded three of its eight federal deputies, including the 
leader, because they had gone against the party guidelines. In this episode the 
PT showed that, as a party, it was still strongly attached to an ethics of con-
viction; it took the risk of contributing, indirectly, to electing the candidate of 
the military to the Presidency of Brazil, in order not to make a pact with the 
elites that led the political oppositions to close ranks around Tancredo Neves 
– who was then elected but died before being sworn into office. To the public 
the party continued to appear radical. 
During the National Assembly to write the Constitution (“Constituinte”), 
which took place between 1987 and 1988, the PT had an outstanding per-
formance on many committees and gathered support to include several of its 
political agendas, especially social rights, in the new Federal Constitution – at 
the price of tacitly accepting the formal game of bourgeois democracy. For 
the great majority of organized social movements in the country, this was the 
most receptive channel for their demands. The strategy followed by the 
movements was to ensure that there would be a broad ensemble of demands 
included as rights in the legal texts, in the expectation that they would later be 
fulfilled.
However, a significant part of the “conquests” was suppressed already 
during the second round of voting, when the more conservative sectors man-
aged to achieve a more cohesive articulation. It was in this legislature that 
Lula had his only term in parliament. The performance in the “Constituinte” 
was damaged in the eyes of public opinion when at the end of the assembly, 
all of the PT caucus refused to sign the new Constitution. But, with this atti-
tude, the party once again showed that it was faithful to its origins and did not 
accept the rules of the game, since they wanted the approval of issues such as 
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an audit of the foreign debt, the nationalization of banks and mineral wealth, 
urban and agrarian land reform.  
During this period, between the “Constituinte” and the second round of 
presidential elections in December 1989, Brazil was facing the choice of the 
model of society that would be implemented, a radically democratic society 
with a guarantee of social rights of citizenship, with a sovereign national pro-
ject, change in the structures producing inequality and poverty, or else an in-
sertion subordinated to international capitalism, with a neoliberal profile and 
guided by the Washington Consensus, actually increasing the historical social 
inequality. Lula’s defeat and the election of Collor de Mello showed that the 
choice was in favor of the second alternative (Sobottka 2003). 
Thus, the experiences of the PT in heading local governments already 
took place in a very different context from when the party was founded. The 
military regime had ended, a multiparty democracy was in place and unions 
and social movements had become strong social actors. Two much broader 
changes were taking place in this context: first, the Berlin Wall came down, 
and with it, part of the credibility of the Socialist alternative sought by the 
PT; secondly, the neoliberal movement, which, one decade earlier had 
reached power in Western European countries and in the United States, had 
now also become victorious in Latin American. Thus, new agendas began to 
take the central place in politics, such as stability, efficiency, good govern-
ment, fiscal balance.  
Participation and democracy: The PT way of governing 
The first experiences of the PT in government at a local level were not good. 
In 1982, in the first election in which the PT participated, it won in Diadema, 
a city in the metropolitan area of São Paulo where it had a strong union base, 
and in a small town in Maranhão. Three years later, in a complementary elec-
tion, it won the election in Fortaleza. The mayor in Maranhão soon changed 
to another political party, and the two other terms were marked by conflict 
around the influence of the party in the administration.  As a result, the peo-
ple elected ended up leaving the party. 
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In 1988, the PT won the dispute for the city administration in several me-
dium-sized and large cities, including São Paulo and Porto Alegre. In some 
cities it had made alliances with other leftwing parties. For the first time it 
had been placed before the challenge of leaving the opposition to manage a 
number of major cities in Brazil. The city of São Paulo has the third largest 
budget in Brazil, losing only to the Federal Government and to the state of 
São Paulo itself. Now the PT had to find ways of applying to the everyday 
work of public management its proposal to invert the priorities of previous 
governments, of being different from other parties in dealing with the public 
weal, of ensuring the rights of those who were historically relegated to a sec-
ondary role, and to profoundly transform the current society.  
In a few cases, the first initiatives were marked by very great voluntarism, 
and resulted in failures. This is clearly shown by public transport in Porto 
Alegre. The city administration intervened in the public transport companies 
with the express goal of lowering the price of tickets, alleging that the con-
cessionaires were using the money on other companies. For most of the com-
panies, the fate was expropriation. After managing the system for a long time, 
the city administration made an agreement with the owners, returned the 
companies to them and instituted programs for capitalization, fleet renewal 
and improvements of the service – at higher ticket prices than the original 
ones. The greatest mistake lay in the fact that the PT wanted to offer cheap 
transport by diminishing the profits of the capitalist owners, but the popula-
tion demanded, above all, quality transport. Price was not such a serious is-
sue, since the salaried workers’ expenditures on transport are limited to 6% of 
their wages, the remainder being paid by the employers.  
The PT has reacted to the situation as a whole by holding seminars, fo-
rums of discussion and training programs. The scarce experience in public 
management, the many dreams of a better society and above all the support 
the party had among intellectuals and professionals, resonated in these 
events. The result of these initiatives was a set of texts publicized as the PT
way of governing. At the limit, as fondly hoped by some of its most optimis-
tic formulators, this way of governing could even constitute the alternative 
form of transition to socialism through a democratic route. Emphasis, how-
ever, was on the binomial inversion of priorities and participation of the peo-
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ple. With this the PT had decided to govern in a more inclusive way, but pri-
oritizing the segments that had been neglected until this point, in agreement 
with what it understood to be the mission received in the polls, and strength-
ening the participation of the very low income population in the local gov-
ernment decisions. The document shows the party beginning the transition 
from its programmatic choice towards pragmatism seen as necessary to par-
ticipate responsibly in the democratic institutions. 
When describing this challenge to his fellow party members, the then sec-
retary for institutional affairs, Jorge Bittar, admitted that in the past there had 
been a maximization of the objectives by the party when taking on claims of 
the social movements, such as the government running transport and the 
health system, the democratization of access to public education, the social 
use of urban land and the formation of people’s councils (Bittar 1992). He 
thus acknowledged that considering the victories in the elections, the long-
term party objectives – synthetically expressed in the goal of implementing 
socialism by the democratic route – required a political mediation that would 
render the public management of the municipality feasible within the con-
crete conditions of Brazilian reality. Seeking this mediation, the set of propo-
sitions defined as the PT way of governing arose, which in brief consists of 
the following points: (a) reinforcing the political culture of collective and in-
dividual rights instead of favor as legitimation of political power; (b) 
strengthening the local Legislature; (c) emphasizing ethics in the transform-
ing policy and reintroducing morality in dealing with the public weal; (d) in-
stituting the right to participation, combining representative democracy with 
participatory democracy (Bittar 1992). 
This new municipal government program attempted to reconcile the the-
ses publicly defended by the party with the daily needs of public manage-
ment, without neglecting the permanent need to maintain, and if possible ex-
tend, its legitimacy in the eyes of the voters. The declared purpose was not 
only to manage well, it was also to reform the local form of the state structur-
ally. In this sense, the same document lists the central traits of the intended 
reform: (a) participation of the people in order to guarantee that the govern-
ment plan will be implemented and ensure a shift in the correlation of forces 
between “popular and dominant classes”; (b) to invert the government’s pri-
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orities, ensuring that investments will be channeled to areas considered most 
needy, recovering the quality of public service and guaranteeing equal access 
to basic services for all; (c) to de-privatize, democratize, and render the state 
public, combating clientelism and corruption; (d) to politicize the distribution 
of public funds; (e) to practice a policy of alliances which will ensure the po-
litical and social support of the government, involving even the municipal 
legislature (city council).  
The PT chose to further the political decentralization in its own way, 
opening up public management to sectors that were previously relegated to 
apathy, to clientelistic cooperation, or to claims organized into social move-
ments. It was thought that this participation could be easily solved through 
co-management with an adequate division of tasks, expressed as follows: 
“There are tasks that are the responsibility of social movements, such as cre-
ating autonomous spaces for organization and specific forms of institutionali-
zation of their representations. The Executive is responsible for the govern-
ment actions that are to democratize, to include the people’s participation in 
the decision-making and planning process, promote and broaden the forms of 
consulting civil society” (Bittar 2002). 
The expectation of the new governing authorities concerning co-
management and decentralization was that the people’s movement would 
gain strength to contribute as the factor that would be decisive concerning 
power, rendering the local government action governable and legitimate. This 
would thus allow it to put into practice policies turned towards population 
segments that had previously been relatively excluded from the public poli-
cies of the cities. 
Party and social movements were suddenly faced with new roles and a 
new relationship between themselves. For the social movements and other 
bearers of the project of a new society, the time seemed to have come to take 
large steps towards the goal. In this partnership, however, there was an ambi-
guity: the opportunity of participation requires levels of formality and estab-
lishes as logical needs schedules and procedures that are typical of bureauc-
racy or the political game, which are not part of the daily life of movements 
and citizens who were previously not mobilized. Furthermore, it was spon-
66 Emil Albert Sobottka 
   
sored by the public administration which theoretically should have been con-
trolled by it. 
The success and failure of the PT in local administration could be exem-
plified, respectively, by Porto Alegre and São Paulo. In the former the Par-
ticipatory Budget (OP – Orçamento Participativo) was implemented and the 
party remained in power for 16 years. In São Paulo there were two PT ad-
ministrations (Luiza Erundina 1989-1992, Marta Suplicy, 1999-2002) and 
both ended in great wear and tear. But generally the local management of the 
party, especially the OP, gained great political and academic recognition. Be-
sides the large volume of publications, over 100 Brazilian cities adopted 
some form of participatory budget. 
The Participatory Budget was stylized as the venue par excellence of de-
centralized participation and as the distinctive brand of the PT way of gov-
erning (Streck et al. 2005; Sobottka et al. 2005). On opening up part of the 
public budget to indications coming from the population, it created and 
broadened facets of democracy that had been previously unknown in Brazil 
(Santos 2002; Avritzer/Navarro 2003). The PT was very insistent on connect-
ing the OP to the party, transforming it into electoral currency, and not allow-
ing its formalization as a policy of State. With this they lost the opportunity 
of socializing, to all citizens, that which was, unarguably, its greatest innova-
tion in local management. This affects mainly the social movements, since 
local policy is a privileged route to fulfill its demands – and they had de-
manded this participation in decisions on the budget.  
The relationship between the PT and the social movements had been a 
strategic alliance – created and intended for the long-term. According to 
Fleury (1994), “democratization is assumed by these movements as being an 
indispensable condition to improve their living conditions, insofar as the in-
strument that can guarantee their capacity to exert pressure is their experience 
in organizing and participating.” But they do not have direct access to the 
central organs of power and public administration. That is why many of their 
leaders seek to personally join in building bridges between parties and 
movements. The PT was the main addressee of these efforts.  
The transition of the PT from a class party, advocating a democratic route 
to socialism, to a party that was reasonably successful in several municipal 
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governments is closely linked to its connection with social movements and 
with its “non-traditional” way of doing politics in these initial years. Brazil-
ian politics is considered as traditionally characterized by personalism and 
patrimonialism. The PT proposed to break with this tradition, creating a year-
round political party and, in local management, encouraging the participation 
of citizens in decisions affecting their city, through their organizations. In the 
OP, for instance, in the first few years, belonging to movements or organiza-
tions came first and foremost.  
However, within the PT, from the start there have been two positions in a 
dispute on their relationship with both classical and new social movements 
and civil society in general. On the one hand there is a vanguard conception 
that believes activists should occupy strategic positions and lead the groups 
ideologically. On the other, there is the conception that considers that the 
party should reflect the movements, in a two-way relationship: being at their 
service as a mediator in the different struggles and, at the same time, recruit 
party cadres and support among them. The relationship with the movements 
was conceived as based on base nuclei, probably an inheritance both from the 
Ecclesial Base Communities and from the socialist tradition of councils. In 
these nuclei, the militants of a neighborhood, a factory, or of some move-
ments would come together as the basic unit of the party, in order to organize 
political action, opine on issues of party life, promote political education and 
suggest agendas for action. The internal democracy was strongly structured 
into a flow of discussions and deliberations that had these nuclei as a point of 
departure. Particularly in the first few years, this structure of nuclei enabled 
the recruitment and organization of a very large number of militants who 
compensated for the lack of other resources that could be mobilized for the 
party.  
Right after the 1982 elections, however, a gradual but continuous substitu-
tion of the binomial of social movements-nuclei by tendencies could be per-
ceived, as a structuring center of the PT base. In an in-house document dis-
cussed at the time (National Plan of Organization), it is said that whereas in 
the three previous years the number of affiliated members was multiplied by 
ten, the number of nuclei did not even double. According to the authors of the 
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document, “the party did not respond satisfactorily to the organization of the 
nuclei”. A little further on, the authors find:
We observed that the nuclei are maintained where they are linked to social 
movements, and where their members are motivated to participate in party 
life. There is a weak PT in places where the social movement is strong, 
but there is no strong PT where the social movements are weak. This, 
means, to say the least, that the PT continues to receive its strength from 
the social movements, but has not provoked their existence where they do 
not exist. 
The more the party established itself as a normal party, with city councilors 
and deputies, mayors and even elected governors, the more the party machine 
grew (Cesar 2002; Novaes 1993; Samuels 1997). The logic of the internal 
disputes to conquer small sinecures  grew in volume, and the tendencies be-
came the structuring space of party life (Gaglietti 2003). For many militants it 
became necessary to choose between dedicating themselves to the movement 
or to the tendency, and the consequence was a greater distance between the 
life of the social movements and the daily life of the party base. In recent 
years, a secretariat has dealt with the relationship between the PT and the 
movements. 
Despite its pragmatic program for local government, at the national level 
the PT, during the 1990s, still faced strong internal tensions between the 
more moderate and more radical sectors. In 1993 it still defined itself as a 
revolutionary and socialist party, and the next year it “denounced the control 
of means of production by the dominant classes” (PT, 1998). Whereas in 
1997 it defended its socialist project as a democratic revolution, the next year 
it stated that capitalism and private property, are not able to assure the future 
of humankind, and demanded a radical land reform and the suspension of the 
payment of foreign debt, because it was the utmost expression of imperial-
ism. Samuels (2004) sees the demand for democratization of the State, made 
by the PT, as a much more political than economic view of socialism. 
In spite of the persistence of radical positions in the party, the daily life of 
PT administration at a local level was fully compatible with the rule of law, 
the rules of democracy and the electoral game. On the national level, also, it 
is possible to observe in Lula’s electoral campaigns, movements towards the 
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moderate center of the political spectrum. In 1994 there was still harsh criti-
cism of the Real Plan conceived by Fernando Henrique Cardoso when he was 
still Minister of the Treasury. But already during the next presidential cam-
paign socialism was no longer mentioned as a goal to be pursued. The PT it-
self, at an extraordinary National Meeting, established a distinction between 
the party program, still defending socialism, and the future electoral program 
of candidate Lula (PT 1998). These tenuous movements reached their high 
point during the preparations for the 2002 electoral campaign. 
The presidential election 
After three consecutive defeats, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva won the presidential 
elections at the end of 2002. What happened for the PT candidate to finally 
reach the top office in the nation? Many factors contributed to this victory, 
among which we will highlight here a few external and a few internal to the PT. 
Both the Cardoso Administration and the model of neoliberal policy that 
he sought to implement had lost a significant part of their former charm in the 
eyes of a large part of the Brazilian voters. That administration, by means that 
were never adequately explained, had managed to get a constitutional 
amendment passed allowing re-election. Right at the beginning of the second 
term, in 1999, there was a crisis in foreign exchange and the devaluation of 
the local currency, shaking the stability of prices which had until then been 
considered the greatest achievement of that administration. This was fol-
lowed by a crisis in the electric power supply, a sector that had just been pri-
vatized, a considerable growth of unemployment and an increased perception 
of insecurity. Thus, in the final period of the second term, the government was 
weakened, although President Cardoso still had good personal prestige. The of-
ficial candidate, José Serra could not make his discourse presenting himself as 
the candidate of change sound credible (Figueiredo/Coutinho 2003). 
Studies also show that, in Brazil, political marketing, especially on televi-
sion, exerts great influence on the voters’ choice of candidates. And Lula’s 
PT employed Duda Mendonça, one of the most prestigious advertising people 
in Brazil, for his campaign. This professional had several times done the 
marketing campaign for Paulo Maluf, a conservative politician sponsored by 
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the military regime, who in one of the campaigns adopted as his motto, “he 
steals but gets things done”. Very early, Duda Mendonça began to create an 
image of Lula as a competent, non-radical negotiator, which became known 
as Lula light. In the words of Figueiredo and Coutinho (2003):  
The political marketing strategy of the candidate found its solution by 
showing a conciliatory Lula, elegantly dressed and supported by a team of 
high-quality scholars and technical specialists. Lula, the candidate, 
showed himself prepared to continue the main lines of the economic pol-
icy and fulfill contracts made with foreign investors; he also showed that 
he would know how to be flexible and negotiate everything needed for the 
good of the country.  
A decisive attitude to allay mistrust among the sectors that feared a break 
with the institutions if Lula were elected was the dissemination of the Letter
to the Brazilian People  three months before the election (Silva 2002). In this 
letter candidate Lula promised that he would not change the tripod of foreign 
currency stability, daring inflation goals and generation of primary surplus to 
service the debt. Thus, he was committing himself to maintaining Cardoso’s 
“neoliberal” policy, which had formerly been so abominated, and which, 
ironically, was losing credibility throughout the continent. Another important 
measure was abandoning the traditional policy of alliances, addressed spe-
cifically at the parties on the left of the electoral spectrum (Lacerda 2002). In 
a doubly significant gesture, the Minas Gerais entrepreneur José de Alencar 
of the Liberal Party was invited to run as Lula’s vice-presidential candidate. 
The displacement of the PT to the center of the political spectrum was ren-
dered easier by the fact that the two large parties that traditionally occupied 
this space, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB-Partido 
do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro), and the Party of the Brazilian Social 
Democracy (PSDB-Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira), the latter in of-
fice, had taken openly conservative positions in recent years.
The alliance with the PL was particularly controversial. It went against the 
whole tradition of PT alliances, always made in the field of the left, to ap-
proach a party that belongs to the adversary ideological field. PT candidates 
gave up running as a protest and, in regional party offices as in Minas Gerais 
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there was an intervention to impose the alliance. The process of defining this 
alliance is very revealing concerning the changes in the party. 
The PT tradition had, until then, been to discuss, sometimes to exhaustion, 
the theses that were being disputed at all levels of the party (Lacerda 2002). 
Internal democracy during the discussions and mandatory obedience to the 
party decisions were part of a set of rules that had been very zealously ful-
filled (Samuels 1997). At the 2nd PT Congress in 1999, the majority sector 
sought changes in the rules and bylaws that would soften this discipline. Al-
though they had the necessary majority, the changes made were ultimately 
limited in scope (Leal 2005). 
The Extraordinary Meeting of 2002 in preparation for the electoral cam-
paign, however, gave a relatively open permission to the national party lead-
ership, to build alliances that, among the opponents of the Cardoso govern-
ment, could join forces in order to maximize the chances of an electoral vic-
tory for Lula. The National Leadership (diretório) used this “blank check” 
and decided, without any consultation to the rank and file, to establish an alli-
ance with the Liberal Party, offering it the vice-presidential slot. This proce-
dure led Leal (2005) to conclude that “instead of radical changes in the by-
laws or deep structural transformations, it appears to be in daily politics – 
through decisions of the moment, guided by the dispute on the electoral mar-
ket – that the PT slowly transforms itself”. But the attitude convinced the 
voters. Samuels (2004) concludes that “Lula and PT achieved victory because 
both moved to the center of the political spectrum, and voters regarded this 
shift as credible, accepting PT’s ‘deradicalization’”.
This attitude, and above all the fact that it was possible, can be seen as a 
further demonstration that the PT, which was always considered a strong 
party, in which the rank and file had broad control over the leadership, had 
changed its strategy from policy-seeking to vote-seeking. Samuels (2004), 
however, analyzes the internal structures of the party, especially that of the 
rank and file leaders’ relationship and the accountability that the latter should 
have to the former, and concludes that the “PT’s moderation was not simply a 
result of Lula moving to the center and dragging the party with him. Instead, 
the rank and file moderated and then chose to delegate additional autonomy 
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to Lula [...]. These increasingly pragmatic members could influence party de-
cisions because of PT’s internally democratic institutions”. 
When one then looks at the origins, asking what is happening with the so-
cial segments that gave birth to the PT, this thesis becomes more plausible.  
The socially committed groups, especially those formerly connected to the 
Liberation Theology, became the minority in churches. Brazilian Catholicism 
became more conservative and charismatic, most of the Protestant churches 
lost their impulse to commitment and are involved mainly in theological 
themes, and Pentecostalism, which is growing fast, prioritizes traditional wel-
fare work. 
The social movements that had arisen there and recruited their leaders, 
took their own routes. At least since the 1992 Earth Summit, an emptying of 
the movements and a growth in the organizations formerly connected to them 
can be perceived (Sobottka 2003). From radical adversaries or advocacy 
movements, they became partners of the State and even with private compa-
nies in implementing public policies – at the price of accepting the rules im-
posed by the dispute for resources.  
The unions are under the pressure of the worsening of conditions that re-
sulted from the restructuring of production that radically changed the world 
of work in the last few decades. Although in Brazil, the number of unionized 
workers remains relatively stable, the sectors that were the first to create the 
PT, such as metallurgical workers and bank employees, became much 
smaller and to a large extent follow a political orientation that is close to 
other parties. Today the majority of the large unions that constitute the Cen-
tral Workers’ Union, close to the PT, is connected with education, together 
with smaller unions of government employees. Their priority is to fight to 
maintain the conquests of yore. They have dropped the combat against the es-
tablished system, in order to seek greater, and possibly more advantageous 
inclusion in the existing system. 
The classical left found it difficult to keep up their public discourse. A 
few successful local administrations, such as the Porto Alegre one, were led 
by members of these sectors. The fact that they were successful already re-
veals how their leaders became pragmatic political leaders, not to forget that 
a few more radically-oriented groups left the party. Among the independent 
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intellectuals, some ended up by committing themselves to the Cardoso gov-
ernment, and there sought to render their theses feasible, others remained 
committed to the PT project, but became disillusioned during the Lula ad-
ministration. Only very few still remain as sympathizers or active members 
of the party.  
During the election campaign, the PT emphasized hope and their adver-
saries tried to exploit fear. Dias and Perez (2006) define these two poles as 
follows: on the one hand “the hope of transforming the unjust Brazilian social 
landscape, interrupting the persistent vicious cycle of corruption in the State, 
recovering and furthering economic growth, in other words, profound trans-
formations in the social, political and economic spheres of the country.” On 
the other, fear associated with the “loss of credibility of the country on the 
foreign market, the flight of capitals, the increment of the recessive and infla-
tionary process which was already ongoing, in other words, all kinds of mac-
roeconomic disorders that could be associated with a radical change in the 
economic policy of the country.” 
And what won this clash was hope – at least, that is what Lula said, right 
in the beginning of his speech as President-Elect. 
Already as he formed his government team, it became clear that Lula 
would seek to balance continuity and change. Continuity in the macroecon-
omy, admitted in the Letter to the Brazilian People, became clear with ap-
pointments such as that of the ex-President of BankBoston, Henrique 
Meirelles, as President of the Central Bank, of entrepreneur Luiz Fernando 
Furlan to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, and the 
fact that many specialists were kept in positions of trust to which they had 
been appointed by the previous government. The creation of the Zero Hunger 
(Fome Zero) program and the appointment of several historical leaders of the 
PT to areas of government considered social, indicated changes in these areas. 
Continuity in economic policy was the most visible characteristic of eve-
ryday government life. A notorious exception is the foreign policy that com-
bined faithfulness to its long tradition with initiatives to strengthen partners 
previously relegated to a secondary plan. (Vizentini, 2005). The social policy 
had a “turbulent learning period”, between ethical convictions and pragma-
tism (Dias/Perez 2006), without managing to set itself free from the guardi-
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anship of the economic area. Thus, the Lula Administration is reaching its 
end and the statistics of the government themselves – of the Institute of Ap-
plied Research, IPEA (see www.ipea.gov.br) – have not been able to indicate 
consistent changes in the indicators of income distribution, health, schooling, 
or even land reform. The implementation of the budget by the ministries 
themselves, with expenditures well below the predicted level, shows neglect 
with regard to the ensemble of social policies in this administration. 
The most dramatic example of continuity, however, occurred on the level 
of the relationship between the government and a traditionally corrupt par-
liamentary clientele, which became publicly known beginning in May 2005. 
The Brazilian electoral system, with dozens of political parties competing, as 
a rule places the governing authorities, at both the local and state and national 
level, in a minority situation in parliament, and they need to continue obtain-
ing support in order to govern and get their priority policies approved. Lula, 
for instance, had less than 20% of the seats in parliament. The clientelistic 
practice established means that the person who governs often becomes a hos-
tage and has to make many different concessions. The recent denunciations 
unveiled the practice of getting support not only by means of policies negoti-
ated case by case, but also through the distribution of money for political par-
ties and deputies, probably coming from overpriced contracts with State 
companies and government agencies.  
There are two unknowns that cannot be answered here. First, despite in-
vestigations in parliament and public confessions by some of the people in-
volved, the breadth of this practice, whose structure was inherited from the 
previous government, as well as details on the source of the money have not 
been clearly determined. Second, the opinion surveys published in the main 
press are not really conclusive about the impact of those accusations on the 
image of the PT, on its voters and the public at large. The October elections 
will probably provide a more consistent indication. 
But the PT is using a lenient strategy in dealing with issues relating to eth-
ics and the morality of the public weal, formerly considered a characteristic 
of its action. Thus it makes it difficult to keep up the support of middle sec-
tors that joined their project for reasons of conviction. At the last National 
Meeting, in April 2006, for instance, the PT decided that it would only begin 
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to investigate these accusations after the elections – more than eighteen 
months after they were made public. This complacency with regard to cor-
ruption is in contrast, for instance, with the rapid punishment of deputies 
who, at the very beginning of the Lula Administration, remained faithful to 
the party program, voting against the orders of the leadership, and were ex-
pelled from the party within a few days. In this way, the PT is close to be-
coming today only the representative of segmented interests that gather 
within it, and is not able to represent those who dedicated themselves to cre-
ating and advocating new projects for society.  
Thus, the PT, which in the first decade after it was founded tried to polar-
ize politics in Brazil ideologically, which after taking up local administrations 
tried to bring together the maximization of votes and administrative effi-
ciency with the legitimation of its project for democracy, now appears as a 
fully established party, following the rules of the game in what it formerly 
repudiated as bourgeois democracy and capitalism. How this change is per-
ceived by historical militants further left in the party can be illustrated with 
the words of Francisco de Oliveira, in a recent interview (Estado de São 
Paulo, April 28, 2006), on the day the 13th National Meeting of the PT be-
gan, which was to prepare the agendas of the campaign to reelect Lula.  
ESP: “What can one say then to the militants about the future of the party?” 
Oliveira: “It has no future. The PT is going to continue to have a formida-
ble machine, but the influence of the rank and file is no longer relevant. 
[....] It can continue as a political machine, but its character as a trans-
former has already been lost. This cannot be recovered.” 
If Francisco de Oliveira is mistaken or not, will only be known with time. 
The fact is that, in Brazil, which a short while ago seemed to be looking at 
the rebirth of a utopia of a better world in connection with manifestations 
such as the World Social Forum, at present there are no social bearers of new 
utopias, able to cause an impact comparable to that caused by the PT when it 
was created and  during its quarter century trajectory.
References
Abers, Rebecca (2001): Practicing radical democracy: lessons from Brazil. In: Disp, 147: 
32-38.
76 Emil Albert Sobottka 
   
Alvarez, Sonia E. et al. (2000): Cultura e política nos movimentos sociais latino-
americanos: novas leituras. Belo Horizonte: Ufmg. 
Avritzer, Leonardo e Navarro, Zander (2003): A inovação democrática no Brasil: o orça-
mento participativo. São Paulo: Cortez. 
Bittar, Jorge (1992): O modo petista de governar. São Paulo, Teoria & Debate. 
César, Benedito Tadeu (2002): PT: a contemporaneidade possível - base social e projeto 
político (1980-1991). Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade. 
Couto, Cláudio G. (1995): O desafio de ser governo: o PT na Prefeitura de São Paulo 
(1989-1992). São Paulo: Paz e Terra. 
Dias, Marcia R. (2002): Sob o signo da vontade popular: o orçamento participativo e o di-
lema da câmara municipal de Porto Alegre. Belo Horizonte: Ufmg. 
Dias, Marcia R. e Perez, José M. S. (2006): Antes do vendaval: um diagnóstico do gover-
no Lula antes da crise política de 2005. Porto Alegre: Edipucrs. 
Escobar, Arturo e Alvarez, Sonia E. (1992): The making of social movements in Latin 
America: Identity, strategy and democracy. Oxford: Westview. 
Fleury, Sonia (1994): Estado sem cidadãos: seguridade social na América Latina. Rio de 
Janeiro: Fiocruz. 
Gaglietti, Mauro (2003): Ambivalências de uma militância. Porto Alegre: Dacasa. 
Harnecker, Marta (1994): O sonho era possível: a história do Partido dos Trabalhadores 
narrada por seus protagonistas. Sao Paulo: Casa das Américas. 
Jacobi, Pedro R. (1987): Movimentos sociais urbanos no Brasil: reflexão sobre a literatura 
dos anos 70 e 80. In: Boletim Informativo e Bibliográfico de Ciências Sociais, 23: 18-34. 
Jacobi, Pedro R. (1994): Alcances e limites de governos locais progressistas no Brasil: as 
prefeituras petistas. Cadernos Cedec, 34: 2-29. 
Keck, Margareth Elisabeth (1991): PT: a lógica da diferença - o Partido dos Trabalhadores 
na construção da democracia brasileira. São Paulo: Ática. 
Lacerda, Alan Daniel Freire de (2002): O PT e a unidade partidária como problema. In: 
Dados, 45(1): 39-76. 
Leal, Paulo Roberto Figueira (2005): O PT e o dilema da representação política. Rio de 
janeiro: FGV Editora. 
Löwy, Michel (1999): O marxismo na América Latina: uma antologia de 1909 aos dias a-
tuais. São Paulo: Perseu Abramo. 
Meneguello, Rachel (1989): PT: a formação de um partido 1979-1982. São Paulo: Paz e 
Terra.
Moreira, Constanza (2000): A esquerda no Uruguai e no Brasil: cultura política e desen-
volvimento partidário. In: Opinião Pública, 6(1): 17-54. 
Novaes, Carlos A. M. (1993): PT: dilemas da burocratização. In: Novos Estudos, 38: 99-147. 
Nylen, William R. (2000): The making of a loyal opposition: the Workers’ Party (PT) and 
theconsolidation of democracy in Brazil. In: Peter R. Kingstone / Timothy J. Power, 
Democratic Brazil: actors, institutions, and processes. Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press: 126-143. 
Oliveira, Isabel Ribeiro de (1988): trabalho e política: as origens do Partido dos Trabalha-
dores. Petrópolis: Vozes. 
Partido dos Trabalhadores [PT] (1998): Resoluções de encontros e congressos 1979-1998. 
São Paulo: Fundação Perseu Abramo. 
 The Responsibility of Governing and the Changes in the Workers’ Party of Brazil 77
Sader, Emir S. (1995): O anjo torto: esquerda (e direita) no Brasil. São Paulo: Brasiliense. 
Samuels, David (1997). Determinantes do voto partidário em sistemas eleitorais centrados 
no candidato: evidências sobre o Brasil. In: Dados, 40(3). 
Samuels, David (2004): From socialism to social democracy: party organization and the 
transformation of the Workers’ Party in Brazil. Comparative Political Studies: 1-26. 
Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2002): Democratizar a democracia: os caminhos da demo-
cracia participativa. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira. 
Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula da (2002): Carta ao povo brasileiro. In: www.pt.org.br. 
Simões, Julio A. (1992): O dilema da participação popular: a etnografia de um caso. São 
Paulo: Marco Zero. 
Sobottka, Emil. A. (2003): A utopia político-emancipatória em transição: movimentos so-
ciais viram ONGs que viram “terceiro setor”. In: Teoria e Sociedade, 11(1): 48-65. 
Sobottka, E., E. Eggert, Streck D.R. (2005). Research as political-pedagogical mediation. 
Reflections based on the Participative Budget. In: International Journal of Action Re-
search, 1(1): 69-85. 
Streck, D. R., E. Eggert, E. Sobottka (2005). Dizer a sua palavra: educação cidadã, pesqui-
sa participante, orçamento público. Pelotas, Seiva. 
Tavares, José Giusti (2000): Totalitarismo tardio: o caso do PT. Porto Alegre: Mercado 
Aberto. 
Vizentini, Paulo F. (2005): De FHC a Lula: uma década de política externa (1995-2005). 
In: Civitas, 5(1): 381-397. 
Voigt, Léo (1990): A formação do PT: esboço de reconstrução histórica. Porto Alegre: 
Ufrgs [dissertation]. 
      Translated by Hedy L. Hofmann 
About the author 
Emil Albert Sobottka is a professor of Sociology in the graduate programs 
of Social Sciences and Criminal Sciences at the Catholic University 
(Pucrs) in Porto Alegre, and research awarder from The National Re-
search Council of Brasil – CNPq. He does research on the action of the 
social movements and of the NGOs in the processes of public policies and 
is the editor of Civitas – Journal of Social Sciences. 
Author’s address
Emil Albert Sobottka 
Rua Prof. Fitzgerald, 92, Petrópolis, 90470-160 Porto Alegre/RS, Brazil 
E-mail: Sobottka@pucrs.br
